The objective of this study is to verify the influence of budgetary participation on the reduction of information asymmetry in the budget process in a multinational company, having taken for granted that the participatory budget minimizes information asymmetry. Therefore, descriptive research was carried out, in the form of a case study and qualitative type, through interviews and direct observation. The study was applied in a business unit of a multinational company that has the consolidated budget practice. The results of the research show that the company has a participatory budget, for all sectors and managers are directly involved in its preparation. Moreover, several meetings are held to discuss and define the budget targets. However, in this study this condition did not minimize information asymmetry, as most responses focused on a single item, indicating that the sub-manager/subordinate has more information than his superior.
).
This situation is founded on the agency theory, which highlights the agency conflict, i.e., each party (the agent and the principal) has particular interests in the business environment. According to Martins and Lopes (2007, p. 35) , "shareholders' interests are quite different from the interests of the directors of the company and other classes of participants. Each group of stakeholders in the company possesses a distinct class of aspirations."
In the budget process, the goals can be both individual and team, and behavioral problems may arise if the goal is too high (unattainable), if it is too easy (too vague) or if it generates conflicts between the company and the employees' goals (goal conflict) according to Warren, Reeve and Fess (2003) .
It is observed that informational asymmetry can be highly present in the budgeting process; as the planning, execution and control of the business objectives depend on the action of the subordinate managers, and they may have more information, especially when the goals are assigned by superiors without participation of all involved. Therefore, the following issue arises: What is the influence of budgetary participation in the reduction of informational asymmetry in the budget process?
The budgeting process and its involvement with the participation and/or informational asymmetry, also linked to other variables, were studied by Milani (1975) , Shields and Young (1993) , Dunk (1993) , Shields and Shields (1998) , Fisher, Frederickson and Peffer (2002) Tan et al. (2003) , Kyj and Parker (2008) , Zainuddin et al. (2008) , Silva (2009) .
Given this, this research aims to verify the influence of budgetary participation in the reduction of informational asymmetry in the budgeting process of a multinational company. Hendriksen and Van Breda (1999) highlighted that there is informational asymmetry when not all conditions are known to both parties and, therefore, certain consequences are not considered by them.
It has been assumed that the participatory budget minimizes information asymmetry. Faria et al. (2010) (financial or non-financial) in the process of budgeting through negotiation may be a positive indication of minimizing the existence of information asymmetry."
The motivation of the research is justified because the studies on the subject of budget are not conclusive, especially when related to budgetary participation and informational asymmetry. Faria et al. (2010) This article is divided into five sections, starting with the introduction. Then it presents the theoretical construct, next addressing the research methodology procedures and then a description of the data analysis. Finally, the concluding remarks of the study are made.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The scope of this theoretical study consists of budgetary participation, informational asymmetry, budgetary participation versus informational asymmetry and previous studies.
Budgetary Participation
The budgeting process is the way the organization conducts its budget, varying from company to company, according to its operating, capital, technology and human structure. To Frezatti (2009, p.46) , the budget "contains the priorities and direction of the organization for a period and provides an opportunity to evaluate the entity's performance, its internal areas and its managers." [...] It is considered one of the pillars of management and a fundamental tool for accountability that exists in the organization (FREZATTI, 2009 The orientation of the budget depends on the degree of involvement by top management and subordinates in the preparation, which may be of various forms such as top to bottom, bottom to top, or in a participatory manner (ZAINUDDIN et al. 2008) . Shields and Shields (1998) define participatory budgeting as a process in which the sub-manager is involved and has influence in determining the budget. Milani (1975, p. 274, author's translation) mentions that participation "is a concept used to describe the extent to which subordinates are allowed to select their own courses of action."
According to Kyj and Parker (2008, p. 
Informational Asymmetry
Companies, in the operation of their business, make contracts generating various relationships between shareholder and management, sub-managers, government, and other stakeholders. Such relationships are explained by agency theory. The agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a contract in which the principal employs the agent to perform some service on their behalf, involving the delegation of some decision-making authority to the agent. In this case, there is a separation of ownership and control, in which property (principal) is managed by the agent. For Martinez (1998, p. 3) , "the central problem in the analysis of Agency Theory (agency problem) is the ability of the agent to take an opportunistic behavior regarding his actions (or inactions), aiming to increase his personal satisfaction."
In this situation, there arises the possibility of informational asymmetry, in which one party may have more information than the other. "The existence of informational asymmetry allows, in a given transaction, the party that holds a greater degree of information to extract greater benefits than the other" (KLANN et al., 2009, p.8) .
Asymmetric information is defined by Santos et al. (2007, p. 459 ) "as the difference in a contractual relationship between agent and principal, in which one party has more information than the other; i.e. there is hidden information."
Thus, informational asymmetry will exist where one party of the contractual relationship has more information than the other, and this situation will generate conflict if information is used for self-benefit.
Budgetary Participation versus Informational Asymmetry
Budgetary participation can influence informational asymmetry, increasing or decreasing the informational differences between agent and principal. Shields and Young (1993) and Shields and Shields (1998) point out that the greater the information asymmetry between subordinates and superiors, the more likely it is that companies will promote participation in the budget for access to private information of subordinates.
Based on agency theory, managers can promote participation in the budget to access private information held by subordinates. Several researchers mention that subordinates have private information on their areas of responsibility and that participation in the budget provides opportunities for subordinates to share this information with superiors (SHIELDS and SHIELDS, 1998) .
Budget preparation is a critical moment for agency conflict. Silva (2009, p.45 In the preparation of the budget this relationship is reinforced, because the agent will submit a proposal for the application of the main resources for one or more years for investments of short and long term, the approval of which may represent a decisive role in the future of the company. This process can be influenced by the bias of the manager, to the extent that he promotes his own interest, even depending on the terms of the current contract, as contractual theory of the firm.
Studies involving budgetary slack (MERCHANT 1985; GOVINDARAJAN, 1986; CHOW et al., 1988; DUNK; PERERA, 1997, and FISHER et al., 2000) found that individuals reduce informational asymmetry when they are participating in the budget process, given that the budgets would be resulting from such participation, according to Junqueira, Oyadomari and Moraes (2007) .
It is observed that there is a consensus among the authors on the relationship between budgetary participation and informational asymmetry, highlighting that the larger the budgetary share, the lower the informational asymmetry between agent and principal.
Note that the agent and principal relationship involves not only shareholders and executives, but also the company's own employees, as noted by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) . Given the above, it is clear that asymmetry can happen among the employees involved, for example, executive and subordinate.
Previous Studies
Research on the budget of companies is still little explored in the Brazilian scientific community. Leite et al. (2008) reveal that the fact that the budget is a subject little explored by the scientific community may be due to the difficulty of access to information about companies, making it difficult to obtain data for the development of the empirical part of the research. A few previous studies involving national and international budgetary participation and/or informational asymmetry that were used as the basis for this study are discussed below. Milani (1975) dealt with the participation in decision making with special emphasis on participation in the budget. Three behavioral variables were explored in detail: (1) performance, (2) attitude towards the job, and (3) attitude towards the company. The findings of the research show that the relationship between performance and participation in the budget were statistically significant; however there was a lack of significant relationship between the variables of attitude and performance. Shields and Young (1993) resulting from participation except when the budgetary emphasis is low. Shields and Shields (1998) , in their study, analyzed 47 studies published on participatory budgeting and identified that these studies focus on the effects of participatory budgeting, not on its antecedents, and collected information on these antecedents, discussing the results of a survey which identified the reasons managers participate in setting their budgets. They pointed to reasons associated to four theoretical antecedents: environmental and tasks uncertainty, tasks interdependency and information asymmetry between superior and subordinate. The results indicate that participatory budgeting is more important for planning and control, specifically for vertical information sharing and coordination of interdependence, and participatory budgeting correlated with three of the antecedents previously mentioned. Fisher, Frederickson and Peffer (2002) conducted an experimental study with 104 undergraduate students exploring three questions: (1) the effect of information asymmetry on the budget negotiation process, (2) the effect of information asymmetry on budgetary slack, and (3) the budget negotiation between superiors and subordinates, so that there is an agreement between the parties. They concluded that minor differences in negotiating positions do not indicate a greater likelihood of agreement when the initial differences are due to information asymmetry. Furthermore, information asymmetry affects the relationship between bargaining agreement and budgetary slack. Finally, when superiors impose a budget after a negotiation, not making considerations of justice or fairness, this may discourage subordinates.
Fisher et al. (2000) found that the use of budgets to allocate scarce resources, or to allocation. Finally, the findings showed that to reduce the information asymmetry among submanagers, the company can increase its incentives, which will lead to the provision of more accurate budgets. Tan et al. (2003) compared individualist and collectivist behavioral aspects that favor or not information asymmetry. It was also found that individualism versus collectivism can impact on the organizational climate and asymmetry of information in a situation in which bad news should be reported. The results revealed that individualism has a negative impact on the organizational climate, increasing the incidence of asymmetry, while collectivism seemed to minimize the incidence of informational asymmetry. Kyj and Parker (2008) studied the causes or antecedents of participation in the budget.
The study focused on the reasons why the superiors encourage the participation of their subordinates in the budget based on theories such as leadership theory, agency theory and organizational justice. The research findings showed that the relationship between information asymmetry and participation in the budget is not supported. Zainuddin et al. (2008) , adopting a contingency approach, studied information asymmetry; they perceived environmental uncertainty and uncertainty of labor as key factors for participation in the budget, applying a questionnaire to 77 sub-managers. Through a multiple regression analysis, the results indicated that the variety of tasks is strongly associated with participation. However information asymmetry, uncertainty of tasks (analyzability) and perceived uncertainty of the environment are not significantly related to participation in the budget.
In Brazil, Silva (2009) 
METHODOLOGICAL RESEARCH PROCEDURES
As to the objectives, the research is descriptive, because the facts are analyzed without manipulation. Andrade (2002, p.124) states that "In this kind of research, facts are observed, recorded, analyzed, classified and interpreted without the researcher interfering in them. This means that the phenomena of the physical and human world are studied, but not manipulated by the researcher."
With regard to procedures, it is characterized as a case study. Raupp and Beuren (2009, p. 84) mention that "a research case study is mainly characterized by concentrated study of a single case." "[...] It is performed in a more intensive manner, due to the efforts of researchers to focus on a particular object of study." Yin (2005) points out that the case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when this phenomenon and context are not well defined.
As to how to approach the problem, the research is qualitative. Raupp and Beuren (2009, p. 92) state that "in qualitative research, deeper analyses regarding the phenomenon being studied are conceived. The qualitative approach aims to highlight unobserved characteristics by means of a quantitative study, given the shallowness of the latter."
The study took place at the business unit of a multinational company in the metal industry in southern Brazil, which currently has 500 employees. Its choice was made according to the characteristics of the market and the availability of information necessary to achieve the set objective.
The research instruments used were: structured interviews with eight questions, four questions adapted from the work of Milani (1975) to evaluate budgetary participation, and four questions from Dunk (1993) for evaluation of informational asymmetry. The interviews were conducted in a structured manner, the focal type. For Yin (2005) , focal interview means that they are performed in a short period of time, with the character of informal conversation, following a set of questions prepared in advance.
According to Yin (2005) , case studies need not be limited to a single source of evidence; most of the best studies are based on various sources. Direct observation was also used through the visits to carry out the interviews; thus it was possible to know the work environment of the managers, allowing a better assessment in behavioral terms with respect to knowledge, certainty and clarity of responses. Yin (2005, p. 120) 4. How often is discussion related to the budget initiated by your superior, when budgets are being set?
(a) My superior is the one who always takes the initiative for discussions of the budget.
(b) Sometimes my superior takes the initiative for discussions of the budget.
(c) My superior never takes the initiative for discussions of the budget. principal (manager/superior), analyzing the informational asymmetry only in the unit being studied; the top manager of the unit belongs to another unit, the corporate BU.
The interviews were scheduled through e-mails and phone calls, which occurred during the month of September 2010, being held individually, lasting on average 30 minutes each, and mostly in the company´s own facilities, all being recorded. Only two subordinates, those responsible for the human resources and industry tooling sectors, did not participate in the survey.
After compiling the results, the controller was asked to conduct a reading of the results. Yin (2005) considers that the review of the case study by participants and informants of the objective case study is one of the procedures that guarantee the validity of the data.
DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
To reach the goal of this research -analyze the relationship between budgetary participation and informational asymmetry -, the data will be analyzed in two stages. The first stage is the analysis of budgetary participation through questions adapted from Milani (1975) , and the second stage is the analysis of informational asymmetry through the questions of Dunk (1993) . After the performance of the analysis of each stage, it was found that budgetary participation minimizes informational asymmetry, confronting the analysis of the two stages. 
Budgetary Contributions
In the first question, which assesses whether there is participation of all sectors in the preparation of the budget, the response was unanimous; all eight subordinates interviewed responded that there is participation of all sectors in the preparation of the budget and that this participation happens often by subordinates in each sector; being scheduled, on average, four meetings regarding preparation. One respondent noted that he considers the number of meetings to discuss the plan to be too few, considering that a plan is for 12 months.
The unit is divided into ten major sectors, each sector has one or more cost center that needs to be supplied by its subordinate. The composition of the budget takes place between the months of August to December.
In the second question, which examines whether there is participation of all subordinates in budgeting, all respondents answered yes, meaning that all subordinates participate often in budgeting, in which everyone participates, discussing the goals of their area and other areas.
The BU Corporate forwards the general premises (Budget Sales / Market Share) to the business units. After the general premises are disclosed and installed, the subordinates and the manager, through various meetings, define the assumptions for the unit, establishing production capacity and, consequently, the cost and expense budgets and capital expenditures for the following year. Importantly, when the BU Corporate defines the general premises, at certain times, it comes into contact with the unit subordinates to discuss these assumptions. For example, if a certain business unit can or cannot meet the production of a particular item that is carried out in a press. In addition to the Operating Budget, the Capital Budget is also discussed, using the expression Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and if the unit needs to accomplish fixed investment, a project evaluating the return on investment is conducted, as well as the time required to recover the capital invested, and sent to BU corporate for review. This project is also discussed and evaluated between sub-managers and the manager. If various investments are needed, and the resource released by BU corporate is not enough, the priority will be defined by the sub-managers.
When the premises are defined by the sub-managers and the manager of the unit, they are forwarded to the comptroller of BU corporate, which analyzes and, if necessary, requests changes; for example, "we need to reduce the budget by 10%", "an item was submitted that is not feasible." This suggestion is again discussed and analyzed between sub-managers and the manager, who check the area where costs can be reduced. After discussions and definition of goals, the system called Budget Management System (BMS) is opened by the BU corporate for the sub-managers to supply to their cost center.
In addition to participating in budgeting, respondents highlighted that there is strong participation in control between the budgeted and the realized, in which each sub-manager monitors, even daily, the results of his cost center, in which case, the meetings are more frequent. Sub-managers receive daily from the comptroller the results of all cost centers and can track the performance of the other areas, which allows greater control of the results.
On the third question, which was how the respondent considers the importance of his contribution to the preparation of the budget, all responded that they consider their participation in the budget process to be very important. Below, some excerpts from the interview that demonstrate such importance are highlighted: And finally, the last question of this block, which analyzes the frequency of discussion related to the budget, started by his superior, when budgets are being set, two of the eight sub-managers mentioned that sometimes the superior (manager) takes the initiative for discussions of the budget, and the other answered that the superior is the one that always takes the initiative for discussions of the budget. Here are some excerpts from the interviews: 
Informational Asymmetry
On the first question, in comparison with your superior, who has the best information about activities conducted in your area of responsibility, only one of the eight respondents replied that the superior had better information, all others responded that the sub-manager (subordinate) has better information. The following are comments from submanagers during the interview. 
I have better information

Relationship between Budgetary Participation and Informational Asymmetry
It can be observed that there is budgetary participation in the company, since all sectors and sub-managers participate in the setting and monitoring of goals and they consider themselves to be very important for the success of the budget. Moreover, the superior always calls the sub-managers/subordinates to participate in the budget, i.e., subordinates have influence in determining the budgetary actions, including being given freedom to choose their own course of action. Such a scenario presented by the company is in line with the work by Shields (1998) and Milani (1975) for the concepts of budgetary participation.
With respect to informational asymmetry, it was observed that there is informational asymmetry in the company, as the majority of responses focused on a single item, that the sub-manager (subordinate) had better information on activities conducted in his area of responsibility, had a better understanding of the performance potential of his area of responsibility, and he is technically more familiar with the work of his area of responsibility.
This shows, therefore, that the sub-manager/subordinate (agent) has more information than his superior (principle), corroborating the studies of Dunk (1993) .
For Faria et al. (2010) , the budget negotiation can be a positive indication of minimizing the existence of asymmetry of information. Tan et al. (2003) also emphasize that collective behavioral aspects seem to minimize informational asymmetry. However, analyzing the relationship between budgetary participation and informational asymmetry, it appears that, in this study in particular, participation in the budget did not reduce informational asymmetry, corroborating the studies of Shields and Young (1993) and Shields and Shields (1998) .
CONCLUSION
This study attempts to verify the relationship between budgetary participation and informational asymmetry. Therefore, a case study was performed in a multinational company using research tools like interviews and direct observation, with eight sub-managers being interviewed who have direct relation to the preparation of the budget plan.
The presumption raised by the study is that budgetary participation minimizes information asymmetry, considering that the definition of the budget plan together (superior / subordinate) leads to greater integration and communication of all involved, so the exchange and dissemination of the information will be higher. However, research has shown evidence that this assumption cannot be accepted, i. (1985) , Govindarajan (1986) ; Chow et al. (1988) ; Dunk and Perera (1997) and Fisher et al. (2000) .
Nevertheless the results are consistent with those of Shields and Young (1993) and Shields and Shields (1998) . They point out that the greater the information asymmetry, it is more likely that companies will promote the participation in the budget, to access information.
It was observed that the organization has a budget policy that all sub-managers participate in the discussion and defining of the goals, as well as daily monitoring of the budgeted and the realized, generating an open and communicative relationship between superior and subordinate. Imposition of goals was not identified, even in the general premises (sales/markets), starting from BU corporate, such premises are discussed with the business unit, even the final review of the budget being made by BU corporate, all suggestions are discussed and defined jointly.
However this does not lead to the minimization of informational asymmetry, because the information is more in the hands of the subordinates. Most of those interviewed responded that they have better information on activities realized in their area of responsibility, have better understanding of the performance potential of their area of responsibility and considered themselves to be technically more familiar with the work conducted than in relation to their superior.
It is important to note that the research has limitations, notably that the results are restricted to the specific case of a multinational company, being made based on the characteristics of a single organization, as well as by the fact that the research instruments adopted cannot be generalized. Therefore, the findings obtained here refer to the company under study, which may be different if the study is applied in organizational environments that have other characteristics.
Budgetary research is scarce; it is important and necessary to develop other studies.
Thus, future studies will attempt to identify the relationship between budgetary participation and informational asymmetry, at a certain segment of the company through quantitative research. Another suggestion would be the analysis of conflict of interests during the budget process, using as basis the Agency Theory.
